Just after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, I wrote an article with Dr. Thomas Neff about the U.S. increasing nuclear fuel trade with the then Soviet Union. One idea mentioned was that the highly enriched uranium (HEU) in Soviet nuclear warheads could be blended down for fuel in nuclear reactors. In 1991, Tom, who passed away a year ago, wrote an op-ed (“A Grand Uranium Bargain”) in The New York Times suggesting a deal between the U.S. and Russia to blend down the HEU from 20,000+ Russian warheads into reactor fuel.
The accord, known as the HEU Deal, took place over a span of 20 years. It was a highly successful nonproliferation initiative, ensuring that the bomb-grade material and the scientists that had bomb-making know-how were not available for other uses. It also helped the Russian economy, in a difficult situation and starved for hard currency, recover.
The question is whether such an arrangement is appropriate to address the current Iranian situation. Iran does not yet have nuclear warheads packed with HEU, but it did enrich uranium to a level far above what is needed to fuel nuclear reactors. It possibly still possesses this HEU even after the U.S. bombing. This uranium could be blended down to reactor grade by mixing it with lower-grade uranium, like the case with the Russian HEU, if Iran still the capability to do this.
Another option, since time is of the essence, is to swap Iranian HEU for reactor-grade fuel. Russia is the logical choice to do this. In addition to having a strategic relation with Iran, it has the world’s largest uranium enrichment program and is already a nuclear weapons country. As part of the HEU deal, which took place after the Soviet Union split up, the HEU located in the new republics was “repatriated” to Russia. This included Ukraine, where the HEU was swapped for enriched uranium to fuel Ukrainian reactors, exactly what is being proposed in the case of Iran. Of course, there would need to be strict verification that Iranian HEU was removed from the country. This could be done by the IAEA, if permitted to do so.
Russia says it wants to help Iran, and here’s its chance. Apparently, Putin has told Iranian officials that he backs a plan where the country forgoes enrichment. Additionally, there are reports that Russia is willing to replenish Iran’s uranium stocks, which we take to mean their enriched uranium. Thus, even if Iran does not have any HEU remaining, this deal would effectively swap Iran’s ability to make more HEU (and indeed any enriched uranium) for supplies of enriched uranium from Russia.
Whether Iran wants this type of help is another question as it has resisted giving up its enrichment capability and views this as a source of national pride. The United States could incentivize this deal by granting sanctions relief proportionate to the amount of HEU exported and/or the degree to which Iran’s enrichment program is dismantled/terminated. In this way, Russia and the U.S. could team up again in another HEU-type deal, although they would be playing different roles in trying to meet a similar nonproliferation objective.
Iran says it is only interested in peaceful nuclear energy but insists on the right to enrich uranium. However, it is not necessary for a country to have its own uranium enrichment capacity to have nuclear power; many countries with nuclear reactors do not have their own enrichment program. With the proposed initiative, Iran could have enough fuel for its reactor for the foreseeable future, perhaps for the reactor’s entire life, if fuel assurances were tied to a commitment by Iran to abandon enrichment. Iran could also have a path to economic recovery if sanctions relief were granted by the U.S. and perhaps other support was forthcoming from interested parties.
In making this decision, Iran could look at the example of Russia in the 1990s. Many in Russia did not want to give up their HEU supply, as they viewed it as part of their patrimony. However, concerns about Russia’s economic well being in addition to real concerns about nuclear proliferation won the day, and the Russian government agreed to the HEU deal. This decision was more existential than expedient; an important consideration that applies to Iran today.
The title of the paper I wrote with Tom questioned whether a “Win-Win Solution” was possible between the United States and the then Soviet Union. Certainly, the HEU deal between Russia and the U.S., which was far more complex than what is proposed here, met this objective and showed what is possible when the parties to a difficult and sensitive deal are motivated. The question is how motivated today’s parties are for a new deal. Since there would be three parties involved – Iran, Russia, and the United States – if successful it would be a Win-Win-Win Solution.
Jeff Combs is founder, owner, and Chairman of UxC, LLC (UxC) and is a leading expert in the nuclear fuel market, with over 50 years of experience providing economic analysis and forecasting for the front-end of the nuclear fuel cycle. He has extensive and varied expertise, overseeing UxC market reports, providing strategic consulting to major commercial companies in the nuclear fuel industry, and advising governments and international organizations on market and policy issues. Under his management, UxC has grown to become the world’s pre-eminent nuclear fuel market information and analysis company, issuing reports and publishing prices for all front-end nuclear fuel markets. In 2007, UxC teamed with CME/NYMEX to introduce the world’s first uranium futures contract. That same year UxC began reporting on the backend of the fuel cycle. In 2018, Mr. Combs created the atompeace.org website to advance understanding of peaceful uses of the atom in today’s world. During his career, Mr. Combs has presented papers at a variety of nuclear industry and energy economics conferences throughout the world. In addition, he has had his work published in academic and public policy journals. Mr. Combs earned a bachelor's degree in Economics at the University of Virginia, where he also completed his doctoral course work in economics. He is a charter member of the International Association of Energy Economics and is a member of the American Nuclear Society.